59%
of UNGA resolutions went to a recorded vote
% voted
192 of 325 resolutions in 2025 went to a recorded vote. The share more than doubled from 28% in 2024.
A more contested chamber, a still broad formal consensus, a sharply isolated United States, and a stubborn Ukraine fault line.
59%
% voted
192 of 325 resolutions in 2025 went to a recorded vote. The share more than doubled from 28% in 2024.
88%
of 33,363 recorded votes
Most resolutions still passed with broad formal support.
174
of 192 US votes
Opposition to 90.6% of voted resolutions in 2025.
39.5%
% abstain
6.2x higher than every other 2025 vote.
Recorded votes doubled, ‘Yes’ support intensified, and a small opposition cluster became more isolated.
he 2025 UNGA Country Alignment Index captures a world where consensus strengthened around a more ‘Yes’-oriented UN General Assembly behavior. Recorded votes doubled from 95 in 2024 to 192 in 2025, with 59% of adopted resolutions put to a vote. Support also intensified: ‘Yes’ votes rose from 79% to 88%, while abstentions fell from 12% to 7%.
This shift pulled most countries closer to the UNGA majority and left a small opposition cluster more isolated. The bottom of the ranking was led by the United States, Israel, and Argentina. The United States stood out most clearly, ranking last globally after casting 174 ‘No’ votes, equivalent to 90.6% of its recorded votes.
Small and medium-sized states, especially island states, remained central to the UNGA mainstream. Cabo Verde ranked first for a second consecutive year, reflecting stable support for multilateralism, climate action, development, and international cooperation.
Among the permanent members of the Security Council, China was the closest reference point for most countries, while France remained the main Western bridge to consensus. This does not signal a pro-China world so much as a post-unipolar one, in which the United States is increasingly choosing unilateral opposition over multilateral alignment. The story is therefore not simply fragmentation. It is a recomposition of consensus around development, sovereignty, climate, and institutional cooperation, with a small number of states choosing systematic opposition.
Recorded votes expanded sharply in 2025, but the vote mix moved toward stronger overall support and lower abstention.
Share of recorded country votes by vote choice, comparing the prior report cycle with 2025.
Data: 3DL calculations from recorded UNGA votes. 2025 total: 33,363 recorded country votes.
The 2025 voting record points to stronger overall support for resolutions brought to a recorded vote. In the context of a substantial increase in the number of recorded resolutions, from 95 in 2024 to 192 in 2025, the share of "Yes" votes rose by nearly 10 percentage points, from 78.9% to 88.1%, while abstentions fell from 12.5% to 7.0% and "No" votes declined from 8.6% to 5.0%.
Overall, this indicates that the expanded voting agenda in 2025 was accompanied by a more consolidated pattern of support across resolutions put to vote.
BRB
Barbados
145 recorded votes, all YES
CPV
Cabo Verde
184 recorded votes, all YES
URY
Uruguay
190 recorded votes, all YES
The countries that most often voted "No" by themselves were:
| United States | 43 |
|---|---|
| Russia | 2 |
| India | 1 |
| Turkiye | 1 |
| Canada | 1 |
Of these 40 pairs, 39 included the United States.
| United States + Argentina | 17 |
|---|---|
| United States + Israel | 17 |
| United States + Russia | 3 |
| United States + North Korea (PRK) | 1 |
| United States + Belarus | 1 |
| Russia + Nicaragua | 1 |
Over the past ten years, the number of UNGA resolutions requiring a vote remained fairly stable, usually accounting for around or slightly less than one third of all resolutions, while the majority were adopted without a vote, by consensus.
The total number of resolutions adopted each year also remained broadly steady, generally within the 330-345 range, except in 2020, when UN activity was affected by the pandemic and only 309 resolutions were registered. In 2025, the overall number of resolutions remained comparable at 325, but the share requiring a vote rose sharply to 59%, marking a clear break from the pattern observed in previous years.
Country counts by global alignment score range.
Increased
95.81% of countries
Declined
3.66% of countries
Unchanged
0.52% of countries
A year-on-year comparison of country scores shows that the vast majority of countries improved their global alignment between 2024 and 2025. Out of 191 countries, 183 countries recorded an increase, representing 95.81% of the total.
In contrast, 7 countries registered a decline, while 1 country remained unchanged. The only country with no year-on-year change was Cabo Verde, which remained at 100.00, retaining its position at the top of the ranking.
Three years stand out
2020
A temporary convergence in voting behavior, with many countries aligning more closely amid the pandemic and a broader multilateral response.
2022
The start of war generated a sharp polarization in UN voting, with many states avoiding clear bloc alignment through abstentions, which pushed more countries into the middle ranges.
2025
A strong clustering of countries at high and very high alignment levels, while the United States appears as a major outlier at the bottom, reflecting growing isolation from the broader voting pattern.
Aggregate vote totals and 2024 comparison points are from 3DL 2025 report calculations.
Country-level JSONPillar 3 year-on-year rank changes reveal where voting behavior converged with, or moved sharply away from, the prevailing UNGA majority.
Metric: Pillar 3, Global Alignment, measuring alignment with the prevailing UNGA majority. Rank convention: 1 is highest global alignment; positive rank delta means a country rose in the ranking.
Universe: 191 countries with non-null Pillar 3 records in both 2024 and 2025. Afghanistan and Venezuela are excluded because they had no recorded 2025 votes.
Madagascar
Recorded the steepest Pillar 3 fall among the highlighted countries, dropping 94 places into the bottom-ten group.
90.7 -> 83.1
Uruguay
Entered the shared first-place group on Pillar 3 with a perfect 2025 global-alignment score.
92.1 -> 100.0
Paraguay
Moved down sharply on Pillar 3 to sit just above the lowest-alignment cluster.
72.0 -> 74.2
Guatemala
Posted one of the strongest one-year jumps among the 2025 Pillar 3 top ten.
93.7 -> 99.5
Uruguay moved into the shared first-place group on Pillar 3 in 2025, combining a perfect global-alignment score with one of the largest one-year rank gains in the dataset.
Its movement shows that high alignment in 2025 was not only a matter of long-term stability. Some countries converged quickly with prevailing voting patterns.
Uruguay shares rank #1 with Barbados and Cabo Verde; all three score 100.0 on Pillar 3 in 2025.
Also worth a closer read
Madagascar
Africa · #90 -> #184
Madagascar registered the most severe Pillar 3 decline among the highlighted cards, falling into the bottom-ten group on global alignment.
Guatemala
Americas · #54 -> #8
Guatemala climbed into the Pillar 3 top ten with a 99.47 global-alignment score and a strong one-year rank increase.
Regional pulse
Mean Pillar 3 score by region in 2025, with year-on-year delta
| Region | 2025 | Δ vs 2024 | Pattern |
|---|---|---|---|
| AfricaHigh and rising | 96.7 | +4.9 | High and rising |
| AmericasMost dispersed | 92.4 | +4 | Most dispersed |
| AsiaTight and rising | 95.7 | +9.8 | Tight and rising |
| EuropeMost cohesive | 87.6 | +23.6 | Most cohesive |
| Middle EastFragmented | 90.0 | +9.3 | Fragmented |
| OceaniaStable and aligned | 93.2 | +5.1 | Stable and aligned |
The 2025 rankings place small and often island states at the top of the UNGA majority, while the United States, Israel, and Argentina define the sharpest divergence from prevailing UN positions.
The 2025 global alignment rankings show a widening contrast between countries that remain closely anchored to the broader UNGA majority and those moving further away from it. At the top, small and often island states continue to display high levels of consistency with multilateral voting patterns, especially on issues such as climate and development, while the bottom is increasingly defined by the United States, Israel, and Argentina, a trio marked by growing ideological alignment and sharper divergence from prevailing UN positions.
Small and medium sized states dominate the top ten, with island countries especially visible. Uruguay and Guatemala show that high alignment in 2025 also reflected recent convergence, not only long term stability.
| Rank | Country | Score | 1Y |
|---|---|---|---|
| #1 | BarbadosBRB | 100.01Y +11 | +11 |
| #1 | Cabo VerdeCPV | 100.01Y 0 | 0 |
| #1 | UruguayURY | 100.01Y +73 | +73 |
| #4 | SurinameSUR | 99.71Y -2 | -2 |
| #5 | JamaicaJAM | 99.71Y +8 | +8 |
| #6 | SeychellesSYC | 99.71Y +2 | +2 |
| #7 | AzerbaijanAZE | 99.71Y +3 | +3 |
| #8 | ChileCHL | 99.51Y +27 | +27 |
| #8 | GuatemalaGTM | 99.51Y +46 | +46 |
| #10 | Timor-LesteTLS | 99.51Y +29 | +29 |
The bottom is led by the United States, Israel, and Argentina. The United States overtook Israel as the least aligned country in 2025, while Argentina's recent foreign policy turn pulled it closer to this opposition cluster.
| Rank | Country | Score | 1Y |
|---|---|---|---|
| #191 | United States of AmericaUSA | 0.01Y -1 | -1 |
| #190 | IsraelISR | 12.91Y +1 | +1 |
| #189 | ArgentinaARG | 32.81Y 0 | 0 |
| #188 | ParaguayPRY | 74.21Y -48 | -48 |
| #187 | South SudanSSD | 76.21Y -26 | -26 |
| #186 | NauruNRU | 78.81Y -28 | -28 |
| #185 | HungaryHUN | 81.51Y +2 | +2 |
| #184 | MadagascarMDG | 83.11Y -94 | -94 |
| #183 | North MacedoniaMKD | 83.31Y -15 | -15 |
| #182 | UkraineUKR | 84.01Y +4 | +4 |
Country deep dives
Lowest Global Alignment
The United States ranked last in global alignment in 2025, with sharp declines across global, regional, and internal indicators. Trump's return produced a broader rejection of UNGA consensus, especially on sovereignty, migration, climate, humanitarian governance, and multilateral cooperation.
Global Alignment
-1Regional Alignment
-124Internal Alignment
-43Voting record UNGA 2025
United States of America
Yes 5.2% · Abstain 4.2% · No 91%
World Average
Yes 88% · Abstain 7.0% · No 5.0%
The United States' 2025 voting record shows a sharp movement away from UNGA consensus positions, reflecting the ideological turn marked by President Donald Trump's return to office. The shift is especially visible across topics where the U.S. moved from full support in 2024 to full opposition in 2025, including Environment, Basic Needs, Artificial Intelligence, Law of the Sea, Arms Transfers, Counter-terrorism, Humanitarian Intervention, International Criminal Courts, Women's Rights, and Outer Space.
This pattern suggests more than issue-specific disagreement. It reflects a broader rejection of multilateral frameworks that constrain national sovereignty or require collective responsibility. The U.S. position hardened not only on traditional security questions, but also on themes usually associated with global public goods, humanitarian governance, legal accountability, and social rights.
Trump's UNGA 80 address gave this voting pattern its ideological frame. He did not simply criticize the UN's inefficiency; he openly questioned its purpose, asking: "What is the purpose of the United Nations?" Migration was the clearest political marker. He described migration as a threat to Western survival, accused the UN of helping finance it, and presented deportation, border closure, and cultural protection as universal lessons for other states. Climate politics received similar treatment, framed as a "con job" weakening developed countries.
The result is a foreign policy posture in which sovereignty is defined less through participation in international order than through resistance to it. In 2025, the United States did not simply vote against specific resolutions; it advanced a broader critique of multilateralism itself.
Donald J. Trump, UNGA speech, 23 September 2025
"What makes the world so beautiful is that each country is unique, but to stay this way, every sovereign nation must have the right to control their own borders."
"I've come here today to offer the hand of American leadership and friendship to any nation in this assembly that is willing to join us in forging a safer, more prosperous world."
"the UN is supporting people that are illegally coming into the United States, and then we have to get them out."
Sample Topics change
| Topic | 2025 Yes | Change |
|---|---|---|
| Chemical Weapons | 67% -> 100% | +33.3 pp |
| Peacebuilding | 0.0% -> 25% | +25 pp |
| Topic | 2024 Yes | 2025 Yes | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Environment | 100% | 0.0% | -100 pp |
| Basic Needs | 100% | 0.0% | -100 pp |
| Artificial Intelligence | 100% | 0.0% | -100 pp |
| Law of the Sea | 100% | 0.0% | -100 pp |
| Arms Transfers | 100% | 0.0% | -100 pp |
| Counter-Terrorism | 100% | 0.0% | -100 pp |
| Humanitarian Intervention | 100% | 0.0% | -100 pp |
| International Criminal Courts | 100% | 0.0% | -100 pp |
| Women's Rights | 100% | 0.0% | -100 pp |
| Outer Space | 100% | 0.0% | -100 pp |
Internal alignment captures how countries vote relative to how they used to vote.
Learn moreThe world average internal alignment declined in 2025, falling from 78.3 in 2024 to 75.0 in 2025. This marks the first reversal since the sharp collapse of 2020 and 2021, interrupting the recovery that had taken place over the previous three years. Importantly, this was not simply a function of more voting activity: the General Assembly agenda nearly doubled in size in 2025, and even when restricting the sample to high-participation countries, the decline remains. In other words, countries did not just vote more, they were tested across a much broader issue mix and, in many cases, proved less consistent relative to their own recent diplomatic record.
World average, centered 3-year rolling mean, and OLS trendline.
Data: 3DL UNGA alignment calculations. Average is the unweighted mean across countries with non-null values in each year.
Broadly, there are 3 main reasons for sharp changes in internal alignment between 2024 and 2025:
Active driver
The clearest driver of change in 2025 was the emergence of abrupt voting-profile resets. The United States is the most important example: its internal-alignment score fell from 72.0 to 45.2, while its share of “No” votes rose from 54.3% in 2024 to 90.6% in 2025.
This was not simply a marginal hardening of position, but a wholesale shift into near-systematic opposition across the agenda. The break was so large that the United States became negatively correlated with every NATO ally in the dataset, underscoring how exceptional the repositioning was. Argentina continued along a similar path, falling from an already very low 23.1 to an absolute floor of 0.0. In both cases, the decline reflects more than ideological positioning alone: it captures a sharp break with each country’s own recent voting pattern.
Syria also saw a substantial decline, though through a different mechanism. It cast only one “No” vote in 2025, but accumulated 99 absences, pulling it away from its established profile and leaving it less consistently aligned with any stable bloc.
Shifts in internal alignment across voting themes suggest that 2025 was shaped by two overlapping dynamics: first, continued polarization around major geopolitical flashpoints; second, a widening issue agenda that generated new forms of agreement and disagreement.
The most divisive resolutions were concentrated around Ukraine, Iran, and Israel-Palestine, showing that hard-security and sovereignty-related questions still produce the sharpest splits in the Assembly.
A different type of division also became more visible in 2025: a recurring North-South cleavage on questions related to coercive measures, cultural rights, institutional equity, and parts of the development agenda.
In practice, resolutions on unilateral coercive measures, cultural diversity, and the promotion of a democratic and equitable international order often drew opposition from stable Western blocs of roughly 50 to 56 countries. These were not necessarily the resolutions with the lowest support overall, but they often revealed a durable ideological divide between Western states and broader Global South majorities.
Despite the broader rise in “Yes” voting, several themes became less consensual in 2025. The sharpest declines were in Public Finance (-11.9 points), Pollution (-9.8 points), and Mineral Resources (-9.8 points), with smaller but still meaningful drops in Water and Trade-Related Finance.
These are not the highest-volume issues in the dataset, but the pattern is telling: disagreement intensified most where resolutions touched resource allocation, environmental burdens, and the governance of development finance.
Regional alignment captures how countries vote relative to the voting patterns of their regional peers.
Learn moreOverall, regional alignment rose sharply in 2025, increasing from an average score of 90.7 in 2024 to 95.3 in 2025. This +4.6 point jump is not a marginal continuation of the previous year’s movement. It is the largest annual increase in the 2000–2025 series. Unlike Pillar 1 (internal continuity), which weakened in 2025, Pillar 2 shows a broad reconvergence of countries toward the voting patterns of their regional peers.
The rise was broad-based rather than concentrated in a handful of cases. The median score increased from 94.9 to 98.0, the number of countries scoring 95 or above rose from 94 to 148, and those scoring below 80 fell from 21 to 7. In other words, countries became much more tightly clustered around their regional voting patterns in 2025, even as a small number of highly visible outliers remained.
World average, centered 3-year rolling mean, and OLS trendline.
Data: 3DL UNGA alignment calculations. Average is the unweighted mean across countries with non-null values in each year.
Some regions are structurally diverse and prone to lower cohesion. Eastern Asia groups China, Japan, the Koreas, and Mongolia, while Western Asia stretches from the Gulf to the Caucasus and the Near East. In such cases, year-to-year movement offers a clearer signal than static scores. In 2025, these structurally diverse regions posted some of the strongest gains in the dataset, pointing to a marked reduction in fragmentation.
Significant Shifts (+/-1.5+)
The largest moves show reconvergence in structurally diverse regions, with Northern America as the only broad-region decline.
Active region
Northern America was the only broad region to decline in 2025, and by a very wide margin. This was a two-country shift rather than a compositional artefact: both Canada and the United States moved further away from their regional baseline, with Canada falling 12.5 points and the United States 8.2 points. Because the region contains only two members, its average is mechanically sensitive, but the downward move was real in both cases.
Several other regions rose by roughly three to four points, pointing to widespread reconvergence rather than isolated shocks.
Western Europe
92.9 -> 96.8
+3.9
Southern Europe
93.2 -> 97.0
+3.8
Latin America & Caribbean
91.2 -> 94.5
+3.3
The region rebounded strongly despite Argentina remaining a major outlier. In 2025, almost the entire rest of the region clustered at very high levels of alignment. Argentina still lowered the regional average but no longer defined its overall trajectory as strongly as in 2024.
Northern Europe
94.3 -> 97.6
+3.3
Sub-Saharan Africa
93.7 -> 96.8
+3.1
Sub-Saharan Africa reached very high cohesion overall. Most countries in the region clustered close to their regional pattern, although a few lower-scoring cases such as South Sudan still pulled away from the broader bloc.
Northern Africa
95.6 -> 98.4
+2.8
Northern Africa strengthened further from an already high base, confirming continued regional cohesion.
South-eastern Asia
95.7 -> 98.4
+2.7
South-eastern Asia also moved higher, reinforcing its position as one of the most cohesive regions in the dataset.
Global alignment captures how countries vote relative to the prevailing UNGA majority.
Learn moreGlobal alignment rose sharply in 2025, with the world average increasing from 82.2 in 2024 to 92.8 in 2025. The +10.7 point rise is the largest annual increase in the 2000-2025 series and the second-largest in the full 1946-2025 series.
This was not a marginal improvement driven by a handful of cases. The median score rose from 90.1 to 96.8, the number of countries scoring 95 or above jumped from 40 to 112, and 183 of 191 countries improved. The core 2025 story is therefore one of broad reconvergence toward the global center, not universal agreement. Three major outliers remained: the United States (0.0), Israel (12.9), and Argentina (32.8).
World average, centered 3-year rolling mean, and OLS trendline.
Data: 3DL UNGA alignment calculations. Average is the unweighted mean across countries with non-null values in each year.
The main driver of the 2025 shift was a much more concentrated and much more Yes-heavy global voting center. The world vote mix moved from 78.9% Yes / 8.6% No / 12.5% Abstain in 2024 to 88.0% Yes / 5.0% No / 7.0% Abstain in 2025. The average country-level majority-alignment rose from 79.4 to 88.0, while the median rose from 86.8 to 93.8. In practical terms, most countries moved closer to a stronger and more coherent global majority at the same time.
That reconvergence was broad across the agenda. Yes majorities expanded sharply in Development, Economic Development and Development Finance, Social Development, Social Conditions and Equity, Human Rights, International Relations, International Law, and Maintenance of Peace and Security. The 2025 P3 story is therefore not a single-file story. It is a wider consolidation around large Yes majorities across development, social, legal, and institutional resolutions.
Divisive votes still mattered, but they no longer defined the year on their own. The clearest splits remained concentrated in resolutions on human rights in Iran, human rights in the occupied territories of Ukraine, Israeli practices in the occupied territories, and the ES-11 Ukraine peace texts. But these were outweighed numerically by a much larger body of near-consensus votes on South-South cooperation, small island developing States, landlocked developing countries, climate, desertification, disaster risk reduction, outer space, and humanitarian assistance in natural disasters.
The regional picture reinforces the same conclusion. All 14 broad regions improved in 2025, with no regional decline. The largest gains came in Eastern Europe (+27.1), Northern Europe (+24.1), Western Europe (+23.5), and Southern Europe (+20.6), showing that much of Europe moved sharply closer to the global center after a weak 2024 starting point. Eastern Asia (+17.5), Oceania (+12.8), and Western Asia (+11.5) also recorded strong gains. This was a system-wide shift, not a bloc-specific one.
One region remained structurally distinct: Northern America. It improved from 37.1 to 43.7, but still ranked as the lowest-scoring broad region in 2025. That is a two-country story: Canada rose sharply by 29.3 points, while the United States fell by 16.2 points to 0.0, becoming the most extreme global outlier in the dataset.
Regional P3 score change
Broad-region average Pillar 3 scores. Dots show each endpoint; labels show the annual change.
Regional scores increased across all regions between 2024 and 2025, but the pattern suggests a recalibration of the global baseline rather than a uniform substantive shift in voting behaviour.
The most pronounced increases are concentrated in Europe. This likely reflects the growing isolation of the United States in 2025, which lowered the benchmark for global alignment and brought regions that had previously been closer to U.S.-adjacent voting positions into closer proximity with the wider UNGA mainstream.
By contrast, regions such as South-eastern Asia, Central Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean recorded more modest increases, largely because they were already highly aligned in 2024 and had less room to rise. Although all regional scores remain high in 2025, none of the European subregions surpass the 90-point threshold. Asian, African, and Latin American regions continue to cluster at the top, followed by a lower tier of European regions, with Northern America remaining a clear outlier at the bottom.
The largest gains came from countries that moved back toward broad world majorities across many resolutions rather than from one-off issue effects. The common pattern was a move away from mixed Yes/No/Abstain profiles and toward the more Yes-heavy global center that emerged in 2025.
Canada, the UK, France, Germany, and Georgia closed large gaps on development, social-development, economic-development, and welfare-related topics. Ukraine improved through broad reconvergence on development and finance files, not only through war-related resolutions. Russia also improved strongly overall, though it still diverged on some humanitarian-aid and refugee-related topics. China moved into the low 90s as its yearly vote mix shifted closer to the new global center.
Georgia
+38.9
United Kingdom
+32.1
Ukraine
+32.0
Micronesia
+31.6
Czechia
+31.2
Romania
+30.0
Russia
+29.8
Lithuania
+29.8
Hungary
+29.6
Canada
+29.3
A compact slide deck on the most contentious vote, the most avoided Ukraine votes, the geographic agenda, Palestine recognition, P5 proximity, and NATO's distance from the UNGA mainstream.
Sensitive resolutions
The resolution A/RES/80/209, “Human rights and unilateral coercive measures,” frames unilateral sanctions and coercive economic measures as a human-rights issue. It argues that such measures undermine development, restrict access to essential goods and services, and violate principles of sovereignty, non-interference, and the UN Charter. In practice, it functions as a recurring UNGA challenge to sanctions imposed outside the UN Security Council framework, especially those targeting developing countries.
The vote split was stark: 122 in favour, 56 against, and no abstentions. The absence of abstentions is important because it shows a polarized divide rather than a soft consensus. The majority, largely Global South and NAM-aligned states, endorsed the sovereignty and development argument against unilateral sanctions, while the opposing bloc was concentrated among Western states and close partners that defend sanctions as legitimate tools of pressure and accountability.
So the vote reveals a recurring UNGA cleavage: the majority treats sanctions as coercive interference; the West treats them as lawful tools of accountability. It is a human-rights resolution on paper, but politically it functions as a referendum on Western sanctions power.
122
56
0
15
Broader majorities. Sharper isolation at the margins.
The Assembly remained a forum of large majorities in 2025, but the patterns were destabilized by a few states willing to oppose the mainstream systematically.
The most consequential shift of 2025 was the United States falling to last place in global alignment. This is unilateralism that is measurable in voting behavior, not only visible in political rhetoric.
Built on sovereignty, development, non-interference, and opposition to unilateral sanctions, Beijing’s voting profile is closer to the chamber’s mainstream than any other permanent member — even though China itself ranks only #122 overall. France remains the main Western bridge to consensus; the U.S. and Russia are far more isolated reference points.
France’s role as the main Western bridge to the majority — including on Palestine — and a widening gap with EU partners point to a Western camp that remained influential, but internally uneven. Not the collapse of a unified bloc, but long-standing, issue-specific differences made visible.
Cabo Verde’s second consecutive #1 ranking, alongside other highly aligned small states, shows that the UNGA mainstream is often carried by countries whose diplomacy emphasizes consensus, climate, development, international law, and institutional cooperation — the cooperative multilateralism the Assembly still claims to represent.
The United States and Israel remain the core pair, but Argentina’s 2025 voting behavior places it unusually close, turning what was previously U.S.–Israel isolation into a more visible ideological trio — a bilateral relationship defying global consensus consolidating into an emerging coalition.
The large abstention blocs on Ukraine do not signal support for Moscow. They reflect strategic non-alignment, discomfort with selective enforcement, and reluctance to be absorbed into Western coalition politics — one of the main ways Global South states preserve diplomatic flexibility.
“Not the collapse of UNGA consensus, but a sharper contest over what multilateralism is for: a forum for consensus-building, a platform for sovereignty claims, or a stage for ideological opposition to multilateral constraints.”
Three stress tests will reveal whether the 2025 patterns harden into structure or shift again.
Following the U.S. capture of Nicolás Maduro and a possible political transition, the question is whether leadership change translates into a measurable shift in UN voting behavior. Any move toward Washington would surface first on sanctions, human rights, Ukraine, and Israel–Palestine votes.
Trump’s return has already produced a sharper U.S. break with consensus. The revealing question is whether traditional partners — especially the EU — follow Washington or hold the multilateral line on climate, migration, Palestine, Ukraine, sanctions, and accountability. The EU may become the main Western bridge to the UNGA mainstream.
Less a single-country crisis than a stress test for alignments: nuclear, sanctions, maritime disruption, and unilateral U.S.–Israeli action converging in the same debates. Whether European, Gulf, and import-dependent states follow Washington — or peel away under pressure — will reveal how blocs hold under crisis. Leadership change in Iran could also shift its own profile.
A broader majority, a sharper opposition cluster — and a contest over what the UNGA is for.
Read the methodologyThe 2025 record shows a chamber where most countries moved closer to the global majority, especially around development, climate, sovereignty, and institutional cooperation.
The sharpest movement is therefore not broad fragmentation, but isolation at the bottom. The United States, Israel, and Argentina now stand apart from a high-alignment majority increasingly anchored by small and medium-sized states.
The index is treated here as an observable behavior framework rather than a vague proxy for diplomatic sentiment. It measures how countries position themselves through recorded votes and compares that behavior across three levels.
Pillar I
Tracks whether a country is voting in a stable and coherent way across time and issue areas, or whether its profile is becoming more erratic.
Pillar II
Measures how closely a country tracks the aggregate behavior of its regional peers, making divergence or bloc cohesion easier to spot.
Pillar III
Captures the distance between a country's voting behavior and the broader multilateral consensus emerging across the full UNGA sample.
Start with the movement, not the rank alone
A country moving sharply upward or downward can be more analytically meaningful than a country remaining stable near the same tier.
Compare the pillars before drawing conclusions
A country can look stable internally while drifting away from its region, or align regionally while diverging from the global median.
Use spotlights to explain the political story
The report should connect rank changes back to issue clusters, coalition behavior, or major geopolitical shocks.
The UN General Assembly is not simply a stage for speeches. It is also one of the clearest public records of how states signal agreement, dissent, ambiguity, and coalition behavior in a shared forum.
1
vote per state, regardless of size
193
members in the General Assembly chamber
70+
years of compounding voting record
One state, one vote
Each member state participates formally on equal footing, which makes UNGA voting especially useful for tracking how broad or shallow international support really is.
Resolutions carry diplomatic meaning
UNGA resolutions are generally non-binding, but voting choices still communicate coalition discipline, strategic distance, and symbolic positioning.
The record compounds over time
Because voting data stretches across decades, it allows yearly reporting to tie current movement back to longer arcs of alignment, fracture, and issue salience.
A resolution frames the political choice
Every text bundles an issue area, a coalition push, and a degree of diplomatic sensitivity.
States reveal behavior through yes, no, or abstain
Even abstentions and absences are part of the signal because they help distinguish alignment from hedging.
Repeated choices become a pattern
Across enough resolutions, those choices form a behavioral profile that can be compared over time, by region, and against the broader chamber.